In the first decade of the 21 st Century there has been increasing awareness of environmental issues and recognition that these are now global in scope. This has occurred for many reasons and is perhaps best epitomized in the global warming discussion. The dramatic rise of China and India, in particular, reoriented the debate about the sustainability of the current trajectory of fossil fuel usage and environmental degradation. Quite simply, if the economic growth of China, initially, and then India were to follow the historical trajectory of fossil fuel energy usage and resource consumption that Japan, Taiwan, and Korea followed, the environmental impacts would be nothing short of monumental.
This paper does not propose to debate the need for "green technologies" or the merits of particular technologies. It accepts the current trajectory of the fossil fuel-based energy system is not sustainable, environmentally or ethically. Evaluating the merits of particular energy generation or environmental technologies is beyond the scope of this paper and, perhaps, at this early stage unknowable. Rather, the paper addresses the question of whether venture capital (VC) in its current organizational form offers significant promise for funding the commercialization of what we will term "Greentech." To presage the following discussion, this paper is skeptical about the possibility that VC investment can become an important component of the financing of Greentech. This is mainly because the investment criteria for successful venture investing are unlikely to be met by most Green technologies. This is a contrarian perspective as the promise of VC financing for Greentech and the potential of Greentech as a new field of venture investing has already received enormous amounts of interest and hype in the global press and from elements of the venture community. In the academic literature, interest in VC investing in various Green technologies has increased Wüstenhagen and Teppo 2006; Wuebker 2009; Wüstenhagen et al. 2009 ). Despite these pioneering efforts, understanding of Greentech VC investment is still limited.
From a public policy perspective there are reasons to support private VC investment over other more direct corporate subsidy programs. Market-oriented economists would argue that private VC investment is desirable because it eliminates the need for public decision making on which technology or firms should receive funding. This limits the role of government in decision making and trying to "pick" winners -a problem that has gotten significant attention in the energy and industrial policy literature (Helm 2002; Pack and Westphal 1986 ). This position is in particular strongly held in Anglo-Saxon market-centered nations such as the U.S. and U.K.
For the market-oriented economists, the market in the form of VC or other investors will discover, fund, monitor, and assist their Greentech portfolio firms. Proponents of this model in general would confine governmental involvement to funding research and ensuring that markets operate transparently and in a non-discriminatory fashion.
An entirely different group of observers argue that independent VC investing in Greentech should be encouraged because it is not subject to the sunk costs, entrenched interests, and biases of established energy firms and government regulators (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen 2009 ). For them, VCs, with their willingness to support new technical solutions and/or business models, offer hope for change. These advocates observe that in their investment policies independent VCs are not influenced by legacy costs and decisions and thus can finance firms whose success would portend the creative destruction of incumbents. Their goal is that VCsupported entrepreneurship should prove sufficiently disruptive so as to transform the economic environment. In the case of biotechnology, a number of authors have noted that it was the availability of VC that allowed an industry consisting of entrepreneurial firms to be established outside the pharmaceutical industry (Kenney 1986 , Pisano 2006 . The attraction of biotechnology has been the development of new and superior drugs that could demand premium prices in the market.
Despite a relative paucity of commercial success, biotechnology firms have offered sufficiently high returns to their VC investors. Will Greentech produce venture investing successes such as Genentech and Amgen? What is the likelihood that Greentech will produce firms such as Intel, Cisco, Google, and Oracle? For the VCs to have a long-term interest in Greentech, it must perform as well as biotechnology. If a sufficient number of such successful investments are not made, then VC investment in Greentech is likely to precipitously decline, stranding portfolio firms as the hype ends.
VCs have also invested in other industries outside of the IT and biomedical fields. In fact,
VCs are agnostic regarding industrial areas. So, for example, the well-known firm Federal
Express received VC funding, as have a number of airlines such as the now defunct People
Express. The San Francisco brewery Gordon Biersch, which has rapidly expanded, was also the beneficiary of VC financing. All of these were successful investments leading to important IPOs, however VCs did not become significant sources of capital for the package delivery, airline, or microbrewery industries. This is not because entrepreneurship is impossible in these industries, but because there is a relative paucity of the types of opportunities that VCs are comfortable funding. Put simply, VCs are not biased against particular industries; rather they invest in opportunities that are appropriate to their organizational goals.
There has been comparatively little research on VC investment patterns by industry. . As a comparatively recent phenomenon, Greentech VC investing has received little attention in the scholarly press, but enormous attention in the popular press. The major exception is the important paper by Wüstenhagen and Teppo (2006) examining the available evidence regarding VC investing in Greentech firms. Of the four Greentech firms they examined that went public on the NASDAQ in 1999 to 2000, one is no longer listed, two are penny stocks (trading under $1), and one was delisted. In the case of three of these firms, the VCs made adequate returns -a situation that is expected if VCs can make a public offering. The fourth firm Plug Power, which had the best return (not at the time of IPO, but at the end of the share lock-up expiration date), was not VC financed; rather it was a spin-off joint venture. These three was invested in the Industrial/Energy category than was returned in the initial public stock offerings. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the number of mergers that occurred. What this suggests is that more capital was invested in the Industrial/Energy category than was returned through exits -not a sustainable situation. The Industrial/Energy category in terms of investment roughly tracked the collapse in total VC investment, suggesting that it did not perform differently than other VC investing in the aftermath of the Internet Bubble.
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE
Energy-focused VC funds in the European context may offer more attractive returns (Wüstenhagen and Teppo 2006 It may be possible that the returns are not as large, but the other question is will they be sufficient? This is more difficult to answer, as it is contingent upon the relative receptivity of public markets to Greentech firms, government action, price of alternatives, and the quality of the firms and managers involved. This section has suggested that thus far opportunities as large and lucrative as those in IT have not been created in Greentech. Whether they there will be sufficiently large returns to justify investment from VC firms operating under the current Silicon
Valley model is not yet knowable. It is also uncertain that the VC model can be reshaped to justify lower returns, and how that might be done.
Greentech and Venture Capital
How do VC economic dynamics apply to Greentech? An illustration from recent fund raising may clarify the problematic nature of the current VC environment. Many Greentech advocates were excited when in May 2008 one of the elite VC firms Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers (KPCB) announced that it had raised a $500 million Green Growth investment fund (KPCB 2008). As FIGURE ONE demonstrates KPCB was fortunate as the fund was subscribed at the exact peak of the 2008 oil price bubble and the Greentech/Alternative Energy fever.
Regardless of the fate of the fund, as far as returns are concerned, KPCB will reap significant benefits as it collects its 2.5% annual management fee or $12.5 million per year no matter what the returns are to investors.
While VCs are typically agnostic to the industry they invest in, there is a path dependent component of the practice because they continue and even increase investing in industries where they experience success. In fields in which investment returns are low, there is a marked tendency to throttle back investment, e.g., few any longer invest in nanotech firms (and this field was hot less than five years ago). There is a recognition of the importance of path dependence for VC investing in Greentech. For example, Wüstenhagen and Teppo (2006) The difficulties with Greentech investments are well described by Scott Carter, partner at Sequoia Capital:
There's going to be a massive amount of money lost in Cleantech over the next few years although Obama's presidency will probably give it new life for awhile. But that doesn't mean we're not fans of Cleantech and alternative energy. We've been actively investing for three years, but we have one golden rule, which is investing where low capital expenditures are required. That means a big part of the market is a lot less appealing to Sequoia Capital. We view innovation in Cleantech as we do in other technology sectors.
If you have great entrepreneurs who are incredibly frugal, who really focus on delivering a product that solves an immediate need, and you apply those principles to Cleantech, then you're going to make money. (Ernst and Young 2009: 12) Carter understands that there is already overinvestment in the sector, which is, of course, dangerous. He goes further in stating that short-term success will be due to government intervention -hardly a strong incentive for public markets or larger firms to acquire a VCfunded Greentech firm, particularly if the direction government mandation is unclear or erratic.
Carter then states the obvious that many segments of Greentech are not interesting to elite Silicon Valley VCs. There is a possibility that these capital-intensive sectors will be interesting to less sophisticated VCs, or to those that have a lower investment hurdle rate, only time will tell.
Given that Greentech is an enormous and amorphous category, there will undoubtedly be investment opportunities for venture capitalists. Most likely, these opportunities will resemble those that have some of the characteristics of current VC investment areas. In cases where there might be the construction of new infrastructures, there may be significant investment opportunities in providing components or software. For example, though somewhat ill-defined, the roll-out of a "smart" electrical grid could offer significant opportunities for the establishment of new software firms and possibly firms creating communications devices to transmit data through the grid itself. Though most of the focus has been on energy generation, there may be significant opportunities in energy efficiency fields where new materials could create significant cost savings in products produced in great numbers. For example, new technologies may create more efficient lighting systems and the volume of such a consumer product is sufficiently large to be able to generate a good return. Finally, there may be superior materials able to receive intellectual property protection that could eliminate serious environmental hazards. Many of these innovations would not be as highly tied to the energy generation paradigm that drives Greentech investment thinking every time fossil fuel energy prices rise.
The pattern of VC investing in the Industrial/Energy category for the last fourteen years, as Figure Two shows, is highly correlated with the price of oil. Of course, there is a similar correlation in the interest of public stock markets in Industrial-Energy firms. The implication for VC investors is that when they make investments predicated upon a high cost of energy, if energy prices fall, so will the value of their portfolio firm. In cases in which their investments are capital-intensive, the loss in market value will be immediate, unless some other variable such as government interventions, legal requirements, or subsidies, can overcome the market decision.
It is also important to note that when energy prices fall, the hype surrounding Greentech firms also falls, thereby discouraging potential follow-on investors including public markets, potential corporate investors, and other VCs. As Figure India. Thus, some in the VC community have been led to believe that these two factors created a powerful market discontinuity that could be filled by VC. Former vice president Gore was invited to join one of the most elite VC firms in the world, KPCB, as a special limited partner. Ultimately, this strategy proved to be inferior to more collaborative and initially low technology model adopted by the Danes. The Danish experience applies to the current alternative energy investment boom. Much of the equipment to be produced will require investments in manufacturing, which benefits from incremental improvements and in some cases large capital investments. Such firms often exhibit relatively slow growth (5-15 percent per annum) as opposed to the most successful VC-funded firms that grow at 50-100% per annum. This slower growth is not as attractive for VC investors. As Garud and Karnoe so effectively describe, the Danish success was a relatively slow evolutionary process where improvements came gradually and in increments too small to justify VC investing. With the wind turbine industry, a cluster of dedicated suppliers formed to supply the turbine assemblers. But these firms were relatively small and often were existing firms operated by skilled craftsmen who simply repurposed their knowledge of material forming for the growth of the wind turbine industry. By contrast, in Silicon Valley a cluster around the rapidly growing semiconductor industry consisting of semiconductor equipment, design software, and materials suppliers also formed, but these were usually de novo firms. Their growth was rapid and profitability was high, therefore justifying VC investment.
If most Greentech technologies and industries evolve incrementally with few industrychanging breakthroughs, there may not be the same types of investment opportunities that have been seen in the information technologies and university-born human pharmaceuticals. To illustrate the different industry dynamics, the efficiency of wind turbines in converting wind to electricity, or solar photovoltaics in converting sunlight to electricity, have experienced improvements at 1-2 percent per year. Moreover, they are bounded at 100 percent efficiency. In contrast, the electronics industries driven by Moore's law experience operational improvement of approximately 100 percent in 18 months, and there is no obvious upper limit. The point is not to deny that economically significant improvement occurs in Greentech, but rather to observe that they have proceeded rather slowly. A slow pace of incremental improvement may not provide sufficient competitive advantage for a new entrant to overwhelm incumbents.
Market growth is also important. As the success of hybrid and electric vehicles demonstrates, the Greentech market is expanding rapidly -though this is a relative measure.
However, to access these growing markets the Greentech startup must displace incumbents with a similar, though possibly inferior, product. To provide an example, a number of electric automobile firms have been funded by wealthy individuals and VCs. The task for these firms is to unseat existing competitors such as Honda, Nissan, and Toyota, all of which also have significant alternative energy research programs that can be combined with complementary assets such as dealer and suppler networks, capital, and strong manufacturing expertise.
Attacking such firms head-on is a risky business strategy. The historical lesson has been that VC investment has been most successful when there are no incumbents or the incumbents have an entirely different business model, hence Netflix, which delivers videos through the mail, outflanked video stores that required customers to travel to the store.
Green technologies have significant commercial promise particularly if governments mandate their usage. For the VC investor, though, the obstacles to successful investment are daunting. A high level of manufacturing expertise may be required and the amount of capital investment can be too large. A common solution to this problem for VC-backed electronics firms has been to out-source manufacturing. In cases where the product is entirely new and there is little manufacturing expertise, the establishment of in-house production and an active program of incremental improvement might be necessary -but this consumes capital.
Waiting for Godot or Government Subsidies?
There is a long history of argument from Alternative Energy and Greentech supporters stating that since they internalize costs of pollution externalized by fossil fuels they deserve extra-market compensation. 4 Again, this is something that this paper acknowledges but will not dwell upon. Greentech investing is and will continue to be more difficult than IT and even biotechnology due to the dependence of success on non-market factors. Whereas VCs are comfortable dealing with market, technology, and personnel risks, government policy poses another risk for Greentech (for another perspective see Bürer and Wüstenhagen 2008; . In this realm the venture capitalists and their small firms may be competing in lobbying against corporate giants that have more capital and stronger connections to lawmakers. Investing in lobbying is expensive and unproductive for a smaller firm. Obama's stimulus will improve the prospects for their portfolio firms. This suggests that VCs have doubts about the financial viability of Greentech. In effect, Greentech investments may not be able to succeed in the market within which they find themselves, but rather must wait for an outside source to change their market.
For advocates of Greentech, there is another concern, namely that government regulation will choose winners, commercialization models, or lock-out better alternatives. The U.S. purpose is, as it should be, the capturing of out-size returns that justifies their investment practice -a purpose that can be traced back to the pioneers of the VC industry such as American
Research and Development (Hsu and Kenney 2005) . Government incentives meant to encourage VC investment in Greentech must be structured to discourage rent-seeking behavior, not to mandate inflexible solutions, and incent "desirable" investment.
There clearly is a role for the state in encouraging Greentech investment, but the test is in the conceptualization and execution of involvement. In the U.S. context, those advocating government regulations and incentives for Greentech investment may be disappointed in the outcome, which will be shaped by lobbyists for the existing industries. An alternative history would suggest that VC might operate most efficiently in situations where governments made sound macro-level economic decisions such as, for example, a carbon tax and allowed VCs to sort out what they could effectively support. If VC could not operate in such a climate, then it is likely that other financing mechanisms could be substitutes. Angel investors could be substitutes because many are willing to accept higher risks and receive lower returns. In the case of potentially very profitable smaller projects, particularly in the efficiency area, whose potential returns do not justify the attention of full-time VCs, angel investors could provide the necessary funds. Finally, it may be that the Greentech field will require entirely new funding mechanisms.
Discussion
Given the political economic changes expected to result from global warming and the putative possibility that peak oil has been reached, there should be ample opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship in Greentech. Though this essay has been skeptical about the general suitability of VC investing in Greentech among U.S. VCs, there is a distinct possibility that there will be interest and opportunities. It is emphatically not a statement that Greentech lacks economic potential, is unnecessary, or even that there may not be a few good deals in the general Greentech area. Many Greentech businesses can grow using self-financing and investments from friends and family. The Danish wind turbine industry is a classic case of such growth. For these firms, there is no need for VC. Greentech will offer many opportunities to existing small and medium-sized firms with strong technical abilities. In many sectors, European and Japanese "mittelstand" firms will have ample opportunity to use their existing knowledge to develop more environmentally friendly products. They will draw upon their existing competences, as did the Danish metal working firms that were early entrants into the wind turbine industry. Finally, one would expect a number of large existing multinationals such as Siemens, Hitachi, Toshiba, Sanyo, and others to be able to leverage their competences to produce Greentech solutions.
If there is a problem with VC investing in Greentech, it is not that value cannot be created in the industry; rather it is because VC is not organized and structured to support most of the opportunities to create value. As we stated, there will be opportunities providing the returns required by VC and which could benefit from VC. Also, it is unlikely that these will create sectors that allow the powerful feedback loops that occurred in IT and biomedical technologies.
This most recent spike in Greentech investing is exhibiting the same trajectory as previous spikes. This brings us to the contemporary wave of Greentech venture investing, which has been the largest ever. It is impossible to be certain that VC investing in Greentech will continue, or even if the investments already made will survive the suddenly far harsher economic environment of the global economic downturn. Our doubts do not concern the importance of Greentech, but whether VC can provide the financial backing necessary to develop new products and services. There may be some green technologies to which the VC model may be well adapted. Often these are related to industries with a tradition of VC investing such as the development of software to manage energy usage, creating energy conscious websites, providing lower-energy consumption electronic components and equipment, and data center management protocols. There also may be interesting opportunities in technology-intensive, energyefficiency products and a myriad of other areas. Often such firms may not have the potential to grow sufficiently large for an IPO, but may make excellent candidates for trade sales.
One area of substantial entrepreneurial opportunity is in the provision of environmentally friendly products to the giant energy economics of China and India. In China demand for Greentech products are driven by the national government that understands the dimension of the nation's problems. Also, in these nations technical and manufacturing labor costs are sufficiently low that small VC investments could yield large returns. It may be that the most interesting opportunities for VC investment would occur in industries and applications regarding improved efficiency and producing the same products at far less cost, even though these are less glamorous than fuel cells, photovoltaics, electric cars, and biomass conversion VC investors in Greentech will need to identify business opportunities that are not at risk from proximate incumbents and entrepreneurs able to wisely utilize the high powered capital they invest. The challenge of finding potential market opportunities of sufficient size to provide significant growth and exit opportunities may prove more difficult than many believe. (Deloitte 2009: 7) ." Deloitte (2009: 8) opined that this increase could be due to "an increase in government/political support for Greentech and VCs are looking more to government participation in both investments and incentives." Dependence upon government support to make investment decisions financially successful is a dangerous strategy.
Greentech investment has been closely correlated with the price of energy and it is uncertain if this linkage will end. Given the highly volatile history of energy prices, investing in Greentech can be treacherous if the VC investor's timing is less than ideal, because when the investment matures it may be difficult to sell the company due to a weak stock market.
Expecting VC to play a central role in the commercialization of Greentech is unlikely to yield the results that environmental advocates hope. There is a distinct possibility that well-meaning pension funds and endowments seeking to "change the world" with their beneficiaries' funds may lose their investment in VC firms and not have contributed to environmental improvement.
Previous efforts to use VC investing for economic development or other well-meaning causes have often resulted in punishing losses with little advancement of the cause de jour. 1 9 9 5 -1 1 9 9 5 -4 1 9 9 6 -3 1 9 9 7 -2 1 9 9 8 -1 1 9 9 8 -4 1 9 9 9 -3 2 0 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 10,000,000,000 100,000,000,000 1995-1 1995-4 1996-3 1997-2 1998-1 1998-4 1999- 
